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Abstract: Iran-Saudi relationship has constantly been frictional after Islamic revolution 
of Iran. In general, Saudi heavy support of Iraqi government during Iran-Iraq war and 
Iran’s holding political demonstration so-called the Liberation from Infidels gave rise to 
frigidity of mutual relations of the two countries. Meanwhile, one of the means that 
Saudi Arabia, as ally of Iraq, applied to put Iran under pressure was oil and reduction of 
its price in order to decrease Iran’s foreign exchange revenues in which it could not 
supply its essential armaments. The problems, finally, led to cutting off Iran-Saudi 
bilateral relations in 1988. However, after termination of the war and in the early years 
of 1990s, Iran’s relations with Persian Gulf countries in particular Saudi Arabia 
improved gradually.  
The present article hypothesizes that Iran’s internal economic necessities such as 
reconstruction of the war-torn areas, improvement of economic situation and also public 
demands for better life in 1980s, mainly resulted from Iran-Iraq eight-year war, in one 
hand and its dependency on oil revenues to change the terrible situation on the other 
hand caused Iran to re-conciliate its relations with Saudi Arabia due to its influence on 
oil price and quota within OPEC. The study concludes that Iran’s reliance on 
petrodollars and its endeavor to increase oil revenues as well as regaining its previous 
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leadership in OPEC led to renewing of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia in 1991 
and also their cooperation within the organization afterward. 
Key words: Iran; Saudi Arabia; Iran-Iraq war; Economic considerations; petrodollars 
 
Resumé: Les relations entre l'Iran et l'Arabie Saoudite étaient constamment frictionelles 
après la révolution islamique de l'Iran. En général, le soutien de l'Arabie pour le 
gouvernement irakien pendant la guerre Iran-Irak et la maintenance de l'Iran d’une 
démonstration politique dite La libération des infidèles ont donné lieu à la frigidité des 
relations mutuelles des deux pays. En même temps, l'un des moyens que l'Arabie 
saoudite, en tant que l'allié de l'Irak, a appliqué à l’Iran afin de le mettre sous pression 
était le pétrole et la réduction de son prix pouvait diminuer les revenus des échanges 
internationaux de l’Iran avec lesquels il ne pourrait pas fournir ses armements essentiels. 
Les problèmes, finalement, ont conduit à couper les relations bilatérales entre l'Iran et 
l'Arabie Saoudite en 1988. Toutefois, après la fin de la guerre et en début des années 
1990, les relations de l'Iran avec les pays du Golfe Persique, en particulier l'Arabie 
saoudite se sont progressivement améliorées. 
Le présent article fait l'hypothèse que les nécessités économiques internes de l'Iran, 
telles que la reconstruction des zones ravagées par la guerre, l'amélioration de la 
situation économique et l’exigence publique pour une vie meilleure dans les années 
1980, ont résulté principalement d’une part de la guerre de huit ans entre l'Iran et l'Iraq, 
et d’autre part de sa dépendance des revenus pétroliers pour changer la situation terrible. 
Cela a provoqué l'Iran de réconcilier ses relations avec l'Arabie saoudite en raison de son 
influence sur le prix et les quotas de pétrole au sein de l'OPEP. L'étude conclut que la 
dépendance de l'Iran de pétrodollars et ses efforts pour augmenter les revenus pétroliers 
ainsi que de retrouver son ancien rôle directeur dans l'OPEP ont conduit à renouveler ses 
relations diplomatiques avec l'Arabie saoudite en 1991 et leur coopération au sein de 
l'Organisation. 
Mots-clés: Iran; Arabie saoudite ; Guerre Iran-Irak; considérations économiques; 
pétrodollars 
 
 
1. IRAN’S ECONOMIC SITUATION RESULTED FROM 
IRAN-IRAQ WAR IN 1980S 
 
Iran-Iraq eight-year war (1980-88) caused many damages for Iran’s economy. The war impacted on 
different sections of economic and spoiled life of Iranian people by its heavy devastations and expenditures. 
According to Sadowski (1993) Iran spent $644 billion, almost ten times the value of the 1978 gross national 
product (GNP) during the war regardless of matters such as inflation, war casualties and etc. The author 
added that these problems “pushed Iran’s real gross domestic product down from $ 6,052 per capita in 1977 
to $ 2,944 in 1988.” (p.62)  Moreover, as the writer indicates, Iran also owed $6 billion in foreign debts 
during the war. Likewise, many buildings and industries were ruined completely or damaged seriously in 
that period.  For instance, around 87 cities and 2676 villages damaged severely during the war and also, as 
Keddie & Richard (2006) argue, Khorramshahr port, Abadan refinery, and the Kharg loading facilities were 
destroyed during the war. According to the writers, further, “… many wartime shortages continued and 
problems like inflation, unemployment, deficit spending, overwhelming dependence on oil, and declining 
agricultural self-sufficiency were worse than ever” (p.264). Based on Statistics Center of Iran (SCI), there 
were 8.29 million home units available in 1986 while there were 9.67 million families. It showed that 1.38 
million families did not have domicile. It was at the time when the rate of population growth had increased 
from 2.7 in 1976 to 3.9 in 1986 (Momeni, 1998).It was natural that, therefore, increase of population would 
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sophisticate existing dwelling problem. In the last years of the war also lots of home units destroyed or 
damaged by expanding of the war to residential area which inherently worsened the situation.  
Health and treatment sections had also faced with main difficulties in last years of 1980s. Population 
growth caused the decrease in number of physicians from an average of one per 2600 people in 1981 to one 
per 2900 in 1986 and number of hospital beds experienced a decrease of 1.56 per one thousand populations 
in 1981 to 1.46 in 1986 (Momeni, 1998). Unemployment and lack of full job, moreover, was one of the 
problems of the country after victory of Islamic revolution as well as during the Iran-Iraq war. Studying of 
the rate of unemployment indicates that between 1979 and 1985 it increased from one million in 1976 to 2.7 
million in 1985 based on formal census of Iran. It means that 20 percent of active population of the country 
did not have job. This rate in 1988 and1989 was  2.16 and 2.2 million in a year and in 1990 reached to 2.18 
million (Momeni, 1998) which coincided with presence of women in society. Although, due to social and 
cultural limitations in early of 1980s, presence of women in economical activities was in low level however 
after acceptance of the resolution in late of 1980s, presence of woman increased in different economic 
sections which intensified unemployment trend. Rising of women’s requirement for job consequently gave 
rise to a more crisis in job market in following years.  
With regard to critical economic situation of Iran, some scholars believe that ending of the war seemed 
rational decision that could save the country in that juncture. For example, Amirahmadi (1990) see the 
resolution 598 on 18 July 1988 as an opportunity that Iran should have accepted it duo to many  “good 
reasons.” The reasons were: “(1) the economy was in its worst shape ever; (2) the oil revenue had dropped 
from a projected $15 billion to an actual $5.8 billion forcing the government to adopt an austerity Plan for 
New Economic Conditions; (3) international isolation had left Iran with only a few friends; (4) support for 
war was waning at home and at abroad; and (5) thanks to the superpower diplomacy, the war had been 
locked up in a virtual stalemate for almost three years- offensive forces did not seem to be working for the 
either side” (p.54). All of the hardships were at the time when United States (US) had approached to its 
Arab friends including Iraq and also to some extent had entered to Iran-Iraq war in favor of Iraqi forces. In 
effect, as Parsi (2007) argues, war changed “the question of cost-benefit”. That is why, Iran attempted to act 
as rational actor.  
In general, the direct and indirect damages of the war were estimated around $1000 billion (Yaqubi, 
2009). Approximately $500 billion was related to Iran’s economy which 50 percent of it was related to oil 
industry (Razzaghi, 1988). The effect of the war still remained after end of the war in oil section. For 
instance, oil price decreased after the Iran-Iraq war and reached to half price of the mid of 1970s while the 
population of the country had been double (Salehi-Isfahani, 1995). The reason was that “Saudi Arabia 
continued to undermine the Islamic Republic after the Iran-Iraq cease-fire. As was widely reported in the 
New York Times, the kingdom along with Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Iraq stepped up its 
oil production almost immediately after the cease-fire on 20 August 1988. By early October, Saudi 
production reached 5.7 million b/d (barrels per day), well above its OPEC quota of 4.3 million b/d. The 
Saudi claimed that they were protecting their market share from Iran’s possible incursion, a pretext that 
soon became untenable ” (Gillespie & Henry, 1995, p. 207). 
In general, based on Iran’s Central Bank report and estimates concerning economic situation after the 
war it can be observed that GNP decreased to 12.4 in comparison to early year of revolution, budged 
shortage was 50 percent, and inflation rate increased to 28.9  (Yaqubi, 2009). Hashemi Rafsanjani (then 
president) describes the problems after the war as follows: 51 budget shortages, 12 billion foreign debts, 
only 7 billion annual oil incomes, 16 percent unemployment (Khalili, 2005). It was at the time when natural 
catastrophes such as earthquake and flood had intensified the situation. For instance, regarding to the 
Manjil-Rodbar earthquake, on June 21, 1990 Hashemi declared:  “approximately 110,000 residential units 
destroyed” (Hoshang Amirahmadi, 1990, p. 48). This, in return, intensified settlement situation. All these 
evidences revealed critical situation during the war and afterward. At the same time, Iranian people were 
looking for a better life as well as welfare. These circumstances put grave pressure on Hashemi 
Administration to follow foreign policy on the basis of economic requirements after the war.  
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2.  IRAN’S FOREIGN POLICY BASED ON POST WAR 
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
 
All the hardships regarding unemployment, foreign debt, health and education, budget shortage, war-torn 
area and so forth after termination of the war caused president Hashemi Rafsanjani administration change 
his priority in foreign policy based on economic consideration. Meanwhile, Iranians’ looking for welfare 
pressured then administration to attempt to eliminate the existing problems after the termination of the war. 
In this regard, Al-Suwaidi (1996) stressed that important agenda of the government was reconstruction of 
the war-ravaged areas and a general improvement of the quality of life of the population. Indeed, “… the 
devastating economy and the high cost of the eight years war with Iraq as well as the increasing public 
demands for better life had led Rafsanjani to think seriously about the future of the state’s 
economy ”(Alnahas, 2007, p. 152)  in order to stabilize the situation and , as Malek (1991) states,  save the 
country. 
In this case, Menashri (2001, p. 107) explains that “The popular demand for social and economical 
welfare was noticeable especially after the Iran-Iraq war.” The writer continues that president Hashemi 
regarded economic reconstruction as one of major goals of the government. In other words, economic 
situation in 1980s caused Hashemi administration to change his priority in foreign policy based on 
economic re-construction. This is why, Ali Akbar Velayati, (then foreign minister), noted in 1991, 
“economic consideration overshadows political priorities” (Takeyh, 2007, p. 41). In other words,  “… after 
ceasefire, Iran formally appointed economic re-construction policy on the top of its future plans” (Navazani, 
2004, p. 218) or as Gillespie & Henry (1992) state postwar reconstruction became a priority. However, this 
approach in foreign policy was “tactically not strategically” to remove restriction and limitation of 
rebuilding of the country.  Yaqubi (2009) argues that this matter directed revolutionary realists toward 
pragmatism in order to regulate foreign policy goals based on the reconstruction demands.  Therefore, when 
the war ended, the first priority of Hashemi Rafsanjani administration became rebuilding of the country. 
Hashemi said: “We entered forth level of the revolution; that is organizing of country. … We want to 
present a model of Islamic county to the world and that we are looking is economical, scientific, technical 
independence”(Ettelaat Newspaper, 1992b). Moreover, Mohammad Vaezi, deputy minister,  in meeting 
with his Spanish counterpart said: our principle policy is  reconstruction of the country (Ettelaat Newspaper, 
1992a). Even Iranian leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, had same viewpoint regarding primacy of economic 
issues. He, in his historical and significant massage in fortieth day of Khomeini’s death, declared that major 
goal of the revolution at the present time is building of example country in which to provide material 
welfare and social justice besides maintaining of revolutionary ideals and desire, which indicated evolution 
in priorities of foreign policy based on supplying economic demands (Yaqubi, 2009).  
Indeed, when Hashemi Rafsanjani took over the power in 1989, as Kamrava (2005) terms it “Second 
Republic” intended to change social and economic situations and re-build the devastated country. Based on 
the new economic policy Rafsanjani draw some plans which were known as first and second “five-year 
development plans” which mainly were in the framework on reconstruction of war-torn areas along with 
movement from state-run economy to privatization. Keddie and Richard (2006) claimed that Rafsanjani 
vowed to reconstruct the country and replace state-run economy, which was supported by the Islamic Left 
during 1980s, by “market-based” economy as well as “less confrontation” foreign policy. 
Jahangir Amuzegar (1997) ,further, argues that the new leadership , intended to give up “radical Islamic 
economy” as an obstacle of advancement. He terms the new economic reform as “Rafsanjani’s Perestroika” 
which aimed “to transform a vastly regulated, badly distorted, and mismanaged economy into an 
investment-driven, market-oriented and more efficient system. As part of this economic liberation policy, 
concerted efforts have been made towards the marketization and privatization of the economy” (p.317). As 
it is evident, privatization placed in the core of economic reforms. 
In this regard, Mohammadi (2003) explains that  “ ...privatization  of large industries and mines, the 
revival of Tehran Stock Exchange, the abolition of the multiple exchange rate mechanism and its 
replacement with a single market rate, the founding of a number of free trade zone and the encouragement 
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of direct foreign investment” became Iran’s economic goals. Furthermore, [Rafsanjani] encouraged skilled 
Iranian residing abroad to return.  These Iranian who, Daneshkhu (1994) name them as “Iranian exiles” 
included around 1 million that most of them were Iran’s former industrialist elites and managers. Indeed, as 
the author states, in the “decade of reconstruction”, what Rafsanjani termed the second decade of the 
revolution, they were invited to come in order to run the factories. Indeed, Hashemi intended to apply all 
facilities in order to promote economic situation as the most critical problem in the country. However, the 
plan, which Amirahmadi (1990) named it “new version of Musavi’s [then prime minister] plan” was more 
open and extensive. The plan which was sent to Majlis in August 1989 emphasized more on privatization of 
national industries and “economic growth” ,by increasing industrial production, and also ,as Rahnema and 
Behdad (1996) state, elimination of subsidies.  
Amirahmadi (1990) states  that “ Hashemi’s plan focuses on basic industries and large-scale units (as 
were defined in the Musavi Plan) and pays special attention to oil , gas, petrochemicals, cement, mines, 
plastics, and paper products. The plan also proposes to build some 208,000 houses more than the figure 
proposed by its predecessor. Other high-priorities areas are the military, transportation, communications, 
and agriculture” (p. 254). Indeed, “Striving to maintain ideals but also to meet the need of the people, 
Hashemi supported the expansion of the private sector and encouraged expatriate professional and foreign 
firms to return to Iran” (Menashri, 2001, p. 107). 
However, Hashemi new approach in the field of economy had some opponents inside of Iran. The 
opposition groups said that we should emphasize on military reconstruction in order to maintain the 
revolution (Salloukh & Brynen, 2004,Parsi, 2004). Moslem (2002) argues that although the opponents were 
from right faction however they were supportive of “traditional bazaar” in economy.  As a result, Hashemi 
replaced them in Ministry of Economic by the “technocrats” who were mostly educated from United States. 
In response to domestic opposition, Mohammad Hossien Adli, Iran’s Central Bank governor said that 
“fortunately we don’t have any serious military threat.  The threat we do have is economic. If you don’t 
have enough food, even if you have most sophisticated tank, how are you going to use it? ” (Salloukh & 
Brynen, 2004, p. 63).  
In general, main focus of the new administration was on some significant issues: re-construction of the 
country after the eight-year war which had remained many devastated houses and industrial sites …, and 
also reforming of overextended state-run economy by giving more places to private sections as well as 
improving of Iranian’s life. That is why, the age has been known as so-called “reconstruction periods” 
[dorane sazandegi] and Hashemi was named “commander of reconstruction” [sardare sazandegi] as well. 
Therefore, in order to achieve the goals, Iran attempted to improve its relations with other states especially 
with the oil-rich southern neighbors due to its reliance on oil revenue.  
 
3.  ROLE OF OIL IN IRAN’S ECONOMIC RE-CONSTRUCTION 
AND RELATIONSHIP WITH GCC 
 
“Oil revenues accounted for 95 percent of all Iranian income” (Kostiner, 2008). That is why; oil revenue 
and Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) have vital role in economic development and 
reconstruction of Iran. Economic reconstruction of the country which was conducted based on first and 
second development plans mainly were relied on oil income (Marschall, 2003; Abir,2003; 
Ramazani,2004;Yaqubi,2009;Gillespie&Henry,1995).  In other words, reconstruction as well as economic 
reforms needed to be supported by budget which conventionally was supplied by oil revenues. As Menashri 
(2001) states, “Iran’s main source of external revenue was, and still is, oil. …. [It] provided the necessary 
capital for over-ambitious reconstruction programs initiated by the government and put into motion in the 
early 1990s” (p.108).  
Gillespie & Henry (1995), moreover, explain that Rafsanjani’s first development plan was based on 8 
percent annual growth and needed budget was supplied by foreign exchange, $147 billion, non-oil export, 
$17 billion, and oil revenues, $103 billion. With regard to second five-year development plan (1994-98) 
which became bolder they termed oil as “axis of the country’s future development.” In this case, Ramazani 
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(2004) argues that in second plan of development (1994-8), even the share of oil and gas as center of future 
development increased more. So, since oil revenues were regarded as “backbone” of Iran’s economy, 
according to Alnahas (2007), Iranian foreign policy has been strongly on the basis of oil price and ,as Kaim 
(2008) asserts, cooperation with Persian Gulf Countries (GCC), in particular Saudi Arabia remained the 
first priority in the new Iranian foreign policy. 
 In this case, many scholars such as Yaqubi (2009) argue that during constructiveness period, Hashemi 
Rafsanjani’s administration, Iran’s foreign policy with Persian Gulf states had strategic importance. In this 
age Iran’s foreign policy pursued two major goals towards the Gulf countries:  first, achievement of 
harmonic oil policy with main oil producer countries, in the framework of OPEC somewhat it could 
influence on enhancing of oil price, and second, security arrangement in Persian Gulf based on eighth 
article of 598 resolutions. In other words, in order to achieve its goals such as reconstruction of country, 
privatization of nationalized industry, expenditures of the five-year plans alongside Iran’s tendency for 
increasing oil production capacity, 4.5 million by 1993, Iran attempted to re-conciliate its relations with 
Gulf States as main producers of oil. 
For the reasons, central principle of “Neither East Nor West” was replaced by “either North or South” in 
Iran’s foreign policy (Ramazani, 2001). By North, it means Caucasia and central Asia and by south means 
Persian Gulf Countries. Therefore, Rafsanjani declared Iran’s readiness for improvement of relations with 
the Gulf countries. In this respect, Marschall (2003, p. 15) quoted Abbas Maleki, Deputy Foreign Minister, 
that “The Constitution provided the foreign policy priorities. That is to have good relations first, with Iran’s 
neighbors; second, with Islamic countries; third, with the non-aligned developing countries; and fourth, 
with those countries which can fulfill the economic and social needs of the Islamic Republic.”  The Gulf 
States were the only countries which placed in all four categories, and Iran therefore wanted good relations 
especially with its Arab neighbors, including co-operation in the economic and security fields. That is why, 
Iran announced its readiness for improvement of relations with Gulf States in international conference on 
Persian Gulf in Tehran in 1988 (Gillespie & Henry, 1995). In addition, after war Iran started to begin trade 
relations with Gulf neighbors. In this regard, Marschall (2003) explains that “Between 1988 and 1991, Iran 
restored air and sea links with the six states which helped the exchange of goods and visitors. Trade 
increased to a large extent during and after the Gulf Crisis. Economic delegations travelled back and forth, 
and Iran signed bilateral agreements in the fields of trade; transport and communication; cultural, scientific 
and educational co-operation; and oil and gas. Tehran further held talks about agriculture, fisheries and 
labor matters. Iran was also actively represented at Gulf trade fairs” (P.172). 
Regarding to Iran’s new approach toward Arabian neighbors, Al-Suwaidi (1996), furthermore, states that 
Hashemi Rafsanjani pursued three objectives: firstly he intended to keep Iraq under control, secondly to 
improve Iran’s ties with the Gulf States, and thirdly he wanted to increase Iran’s influence on oil policy for 
lower production as well as higher price. The objectives, indeed, were resulted from internal economic 
crisis which the administration had faced with them. In other words, it can be observed that Iran’s foreign 
policy changed towards Persian Gulf states based on “economic and strategic considerations” and Iranian 
president attempted to open Iran’s diplomatic relations with neighboring countries by slogan of 
“development first, rearmament second”, as a first reform in foreign policy of Iran. That is why, according 
to Parsi (2007),Iran attempted to solve its outstanding problems with Gulf countries in order to improve its 
economic ties. Aghazadeh, Minister of Petroleum, in September 1991 said if the Islamic Republic intends 
to preserve its regional superiority, it must improve its economy by increasing its oil production (Gillespie 
& Henry, 1995). That is why; he declared that Iran’s new oil policy indicates “new realism” in world 
market. The new policy was based on making friendship instead of ideological crusade (Ramazani, 2004). 
Therefore, main purposes of Hashemi Rafsanjani’s “good neighbor” policy which was based on 
accommodation with Persian Gulf states in particular Saudi Arabia, were regaining of Iran’s leadership in 
OPEC like 1960s which could enable Iran to increase its oil revenues in order to reconstruct devastated 
economy and the second goal was security of the Persian Gulf due to its importance for Iran’s commercial 
activities which has been conducting mostly through the Gulf. In addition, Iran could relax itself from 
diplomatic isolation which was created by Gulf States. 
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4.  IRAN’S RAPPROCHEMENT WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND 
RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 
 
Iran attempted to accommodate with Saudi Arabia as undisputable leadership in OPEC because 
reconstruction of the country alongside economic reforms or privatization needed to be supported by the 
budget which conventionally was supplied by oil revenues. In other words, since most part of the budget for 
development of the country was based on oil dollars, Iran’s cooperation with Saudi Arabia looked 
necessary due to Saudi strong potential in OPEC and its great influence on oil price. In support of the 
statement, Salloukh & Brynen (2004, p. 74) explain that “… relations with Saudi Arabia was important 
[mostly] in terms of oil revenue, which would fuel the country’s reconstruction.”  In this regard, Yaqubi 
(2009) , furthermore, argues that among oil producer countries, Saudi Arabia had almost exclusive role in 
controlling of oil price because it has had 25.99 percent of world oil resources and also its production 
capacity was more than 9 million per day.  Meanwhile, due to Iran’s economic and political isolations, 
Saudi Arabia became the most influential actor amongst Muslim, in particular Arab countries, due to its 
donation which was stemmed from oil wealth  (Abir, 1993). It, in return, could effect on Iran’s relationship 
with the other littoral states.  That is why; Hashemi Rafsanjani said that confrontation should be replaced by 
cooperation. On the basis of that, Iran warmed up its relations with Saudi Arabia (Yaqubi, 2009). In general, 
it can be mentioned that reconstruction of the country after the war and people requirements for better life 
were main pressures of Hashemi administration for rapprochement with Saudi Arabia.  
In this case, as Salloukh and Brynen, (2004) as well as Yaqubi (2009) explain that re-establishment of 
mutual relations of Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 1991 was the most important Iranian oil policy due to 
Iran and Saudi Arabia competition in OPEC. In order to gain the goal, Iran even ignored internal 
oppositions against improvement of relations with Saudi Arabia and advanced mutual ties with Riyadh duo 
to its influence on oil price as well as quota. 
Yaqubi (2009) quoted Hashemi as saying that we will cooperate with Saudi Arabia in fields of oil and 
regional security and it is in favor of all regional countries. The writer continues that by improvement of 
mutual relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Iran could prevent Saudi low price of oil which was 
supported by United States, and also Iran by revising its’ image, as main threat in the Gulf region, could 
cooperate with other oil producers which consequently led to reduction of Saudi Arabia exclusive power in 
OPEC.  
Iran, indeed, intended to moderate its aggressive policy regarding determination of oil price, and also it 
was going to increase its production to 4.5 million barrels each day in the future (Ramazani, 2001). This 
policy caused Iran to make serious decision in order to consolidate its relations with Saudi Arabia and other 
members of GCC inside and outside of OPEC in order to stabilize the oil market. In this case, Al-Suwaidi 
(1996)  states that Iran aimed to increase its influence on oil policy for lower production as well as higher 
price. With regard to this reality that Saudi Arabia became the most powerful member of OPEC due to its 
high production capacity as well as Iran’s engagement in the war, Iran also, as Marschall, (2003) explains, 
attempted to restore its prior position as leadership in OPEC. It also strived to depoliticize OPEC in order to 
influence on oil quota and price in order to develop economic as well as social circumstances of Iran after 
Iran-Iraq war. However Gillespie & Henry (1995) belive that Iran continued to cooperate with the Saudi 
Arabia within OPEC and was agreeable to prices and quotas, set by the organization, with purpose of 
achieving two main goals; first, to improve its economic situation and second to restore the previous 
position in the regional security arrangments.  
Meanwhile, regional developments like Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which mistuned the oil exporting, and 
also ending of the Second Gulf war which led to presence of United States in the region, had great influence 
on relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, these events melted the freezing relations between the 
two countries for different reasons. According to Rahnema & Behdad (1996) Persian Gulf War or Persian 
second Gulf War was as “ blessing”  for Hashemi Rafsanjani administration. In view-point of the authors, 
the war helped Iran concerning “new economic order”. As Iran needed oil revenues, the War gave rise to 
increasing of oil production from 2.2 million in 1986 to 3.2 million barrels per day in 1990. Moreover, the 
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price raised from $13 in 1986 to around $20 per barrel in 1990. At the time being, the relationship between 
Iran and littoral states in particular Saudi Arabia was becoming better by virtue of Iranian neutrality and 
positive stance during the war. 
Likewise, after ending of Second Gulf War , in one hand, Saudi Arabia surfaced as “the undisputed 
leader of OPEC” and also United States took control of  regional security as well as ‘security of two-third of 
the world’s oil supplies’. Indeed, combination of Saudi’s financial and US military force enabled the two 
countries to manage the world energy order (Robert, 2005). In this case Iran needed to cooperate with Saudi 
Arabia as cordial friend of United States and determinant member of OPEC. On the other hand, Saudi 
Arabia intended to keep Iraq under control and decrease Iran’s support of Shiites in Saudi Arabia. 
Following mutual interests, after re-establishment of diplomatic relations in 1991, after cutting off relations 
in 1988, Velayati visited Saudi Arabia. During the meeting with Fahd, the two sides emphasized on 
economic cooperation as well as Iran-Saudi Arabia’s key role in Persian Gulf. They even elevated their 
relations to ambassadorial level in June 1991 which was unprecedented after the Iranian revolution. That is 
why; as Gillespie & Henry(1995) argue, “ the relative success of OPEC meeting since 1991 –especially the 
cordial and cooperative relations between the two largest producers, Iran and Saudi Arabia- should have 
come as no surprise” (p. 222).  
Although some issues such as The Damascus Declaration, “six plus two agreement” in 1991 , which was 
based on establishment of standing force in Persian Gulf including six littoral countries plus Syria and 
Egypt without presence of Iran ,caused clashes between the two countries in OPEC (Salloukh & Brynen, 
2004) however their relationship improved when Saudi Arabia reduced its pruduction in order to back 
stability of price. Further , in February 1993, during  Hashemi and Saudi minister of education meeting the 
two sides showed their tendecy for extended relations and co-ordinating of their policies in OPEC 
(Marschall, 2003). Later, also, with regard to economic devastation of the country, Rafsanjani telephoned 
“King Fahd [of Saudi Arabia] and Shiekh Al-Sabah [the ruler of Kuwait] in September 1993 in order to 
arrive at a common policy on OPEC oil output and the raising of oil prices” (Ehteshami, 1995, p. 118).  
Therefore, it can be observed that Iran strived to improve its relation with Saudi Arabia due to its 
dependency on oil revenues to solve internal problems. In this case, regional developments such as Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait and the Second Gulf War had significant impact on Iran-Saudi relations and persuaded 
the both sides to decrease tension and in turn co-operate concerning regional issues.  
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
It was evident that Iran was suffering from terrible economic situation in 1980s especially due to Iran-Iraq 
eight-year war. This condition put Hashemi Rafsanjani administration under pressures to change the status 
in that period. That is why; reconstruction of the country became top priority of the administration and 
formed Iran’s foreign policy in that period. Since Iran has depended on petrodollars for the reconstruction 
as well as economic development, it attempted to re-conciliate its relations with Saudi Arabia as dominant 
member of OPEC which was result of its high production capacity and Iran and Iraq engagement, two main 
oil producers, in the regional problems.   
By this rapprochement, Iran also intended to restore its prior position in OPEC as leader, and depoliticize 
OPEC in order to influence on oil quota and price to develop economic as well as social situation of Iranian 
people after Iran-Iraq war. That is why; it seems that although the two countries did not have diplomatic 
relations from 1988, aimed at achieving economic goals, Iran tried to cooperate and improve its relations 
with Saudi Arabia which finally led to re-establishment of Iran-Saudi relations in 1991. In this case, 
regional developments pushed the two sides for establishing better relations and by the improvement of 
political relations and confidence-building; they reached the point that to cooperate seriously in order to 
gain mutual interests in the Persian Gulf region.   
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